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Abstract 
Storage systems are built of fallible components but have to provide high 
degrees of reliability. Besides mirroring and triplicating data, redundant 
storage of information using erasure-correcting codes is the only possibility 
to have data survive device failure.  We provide here exact formula for the 
data-loss probability of a disk array composed of several RAID Level 6 
stripes. This two-failure tolerant is not only used in practice but can also 
provide a reference point for the assessment of other data organizations.  
Keywords: RAID level 6, robustness, reliability 
 
1 Introduction 
Storage systems are built of a large number of fallible components. Failure of some 
of these components might be independent or might be correlated. Often, the causes of 
failures are obscure. For example, Jim Gray’s team at Microsoft research once observed 
that disk reliability in an experimental database for astronomy remarkably increased 
after switching to slightly more expensive enclosures [1]. In this case, the vibrations of a 
failing disk drives caused its neighbors to fail with a much higher probability.  
Failures can happen at all levels in the storage hierarchy. Central components such as 
air conditioning or power supply can fail, and data centers can be flooded. Individual 
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racks can also suffer failure of networking and electricity supply. Individual disks can 
fail in toto or suffer latent sector failures. These incidents happen at surprisingly high 
rates even in large state-of-the art data centers [2, 3, 4]. 
To protect against failures, data has to be stored redundantly. With the recognition of 
the importance of latent sector failures, intra-disk redundancy and other schemes were 
introduced [5], but it was also recognized that protection against single failure is not 
sufficient.  
However, protection against single disk failures date back much further. Originally 
termed Redundant Arrays of Inexpensive Disks, Redundant Arrays of Independent 
Disks (RAID) originally were proposed to allow parallel I/O but were quickly 
recognized to solve an even more important problem, namely the tendency of magnetic 
hard drives to fail, often without warning. The original RAID architecture added a 
parity disk to an ensemble of   data disks. This parity disk would store the bit-wise 
exclusive-or of parallel sectors in the   data disks in its sectors. When a data disk failed 
or became otherwise inaccessible, its contents could be recovered by reading parallel 
sectors in all   surviving disks as the bit-wise exclusive-or of the sector contents. This 
arrangement is called a RAID Level 4. The final architecture, the RAID Level 5, would 
rotate the roll of parity disk among     disks and thus do away with the differences in 
the load. A dedicated parity disk is written with each update to any of the data disks, but 
not read with any look-up, so that its load is the same as that of a dedicated data disk 
only if the read and write loads of the ensemble fulfill a certain linear equation. 
Nevertheless, some important players in the storage industry use dedicated parity disks.  
Not only the presence of latent sector errors (discovered only upon trying to access a 
disk sector) but also the coupling of complete disk failures motivated the introduction of 
higher degrees of failure tolerance. The RAID Level 6 adds one more parity disk to the 
ensemble. The contents of the new parity disk have to be calculated using a more 
involved code, usually defined using Galois field operations, though many other 
possibilities exist [e.g. 6, 7]. 
Since its inception, the architecture of failure tolerating disk arrays has undergone 
constant innovation and more erasure correcting codes and disk array layouts are 
proposed [8, 9]. To evaluate their effectiveness, a disk array consisting of several RAID 
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Level 6 is used as a point of comparison. It seems however that no single calculation of 
RAID Level 6 reliability is published. This short contribution therefore aims at 
rectifying this lacuna. It is in part motivated by reviewing papers that make mistakes in 
the assessment of disk array reliability. We are right now experiencing a revolution in 
the storage industry where flash replaces disk and maybe soon PCM or another non-
volatile memory architecture replaces both. Our analysis will remain valid independent 
of the chosen underlying technology. 
 
 
Figure 1. A disk array made up of five stripes organized as a Level 6 RAID. Each stripe 
consists of six data disks, a P-parity disk, and a Q-parity disk. 
  
2 Failure Tolerance of an Ensemble of Raid Level 6 
With or Without Distributed Parity 
We first look at the classic Level 6 RAID, depicted in Figure 1. The RAID consists 
of   stripes (    in the figure), each with   data disks and 2 parity disks.  In 
Figure 1, we have two types of parity disks, a P-parity, calculated as the bitwise 
exclusive-or of the data disks in the stripe, and a Q-parity, calculated using Galois field 
operations. If we distribute parity, we no longer have dedicated parity disks, but each 
disk will have P- and Q-parity blocks in equal proportion. We will also look at two 
variants. The first variant uses declustering [10], where all disks are divided into disklets 
of equal size. To mn of the         disklets in parallel position, we assign the role of 
data disklet, to   we assign the role of P-parity disklet, and to the remaining   we 
assign the role of Q-parity disklet in a manner that the organization of Figure 1 is true at 
the disklet level. Before declustering, a single or double failure in a stripe made us read 
almost all or all of the disks in the reliability stripe. This recovery load is thus limited to 
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a single stripe. In the declustered version, this recovery load is evenly distributed over 
all surviving disks. On the negative side, if three disks have failed, then it is likely (to be 
made more precise below) that three disklets that have failed are located in the same 
stripe in one of the many configurations. Thus, the possibility to withstand failures is 
smaller, but on the other side, recovery is faster.   
The second variant adds a second Q-parity to each stripe. Since there are too many 
contenders for the title of RAID Level 7, I just call the resulting organization a Level 6+ 
RAID.  Now, the disk array architecture can withstand up to and including three failed 
disks in a single stripe without losing data. 
A. Reliability of the Non-Declustered Level 6 RAID 
We first calculate the robustness, that is, the probability with which an ensemble 
such as that shown in Figure 1 with  stripes of     disks can withstand   individual 
disk failures.  Clearly, in order to not have lost any data, each of the   stripes can have 
at most two failures. We call this selection of f disks a benign failure pattern. Let    be 
the number of stripes with one failed disk and    be the number of stripes with two 
failed disks in a benign failure pattern. Clearly,         or, trivially 
equivalent,        . We now count the number of benign failure patterns with 
  failed disks.  We set     . We first select      stripes with a single failure out of 
the m stripes. Then we select   stripes out of the remaining             
stripes. Finally, we select one of the     disks in each of the   stripes and two of the 
    disks in each of the        stripes. This gives us for the number of good 
patterns 
      ∑(
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The probability of data loss is given by  
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as the opposite probability of the quotient of benign failure patterns of size f over all 
failure patterns of size f. Despite its seeming complexity, mathematical software like 
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Mathematica or software developed using infinite integer precision as afforded by 
Python is able to calculate       exactly, though not instantaneously. 
For small f, we can obtain formulae that are easier to evaluate. For        , the 
probability of data-loss is zero since the disk array can tolerate always two failures. For 
   , it is easier to calculate the malignant failure patterns. Three disks can only cause 
data-loss if they are all located in the same stripe. We model the failures as occurring 
serially in time. The first failure then determines a stripe. The next two failures need to 
fall into the same stripe. There are (     
 
) possibilities to form this malign pattern out of 
(        
 
)  possibilities to select two additional disks to fail. Thus, this happens with 
probability  
            
(   
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For    , a malign failure pattern can have either four failed disks in the same stripe 
or three failed disks in the same stripe and another disk somewhere in another stripe. 
This gives  
 (
   
 
*   (
   
 
*            
malign patterns and the corresponding data-loss probability evaluates to 
            
                             
                                        
. 
B. Reliability of the Non-Decultered Level 6+ RAID 
We extend our methodology to the three-failure tolerance of each single stripe. The 
number of benign failure patterns       is obtained by first selecting positive integers 
        and    such that               , representing stripes with one, two, and 
three different failures. Then we select    stripes out of m, then    stripes out of the 
remaining     , then    out of the remaining         stripes, (or (
 
       
) so 
far), and then for each of the    stripes with one failure, one out of    , for each of 
the    stripes with two failures, two out of    , and finally, for each of the    stripes 
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with three failures, three out of     disks, giving us 
      ∑ (
 
        
*
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Figure 2. Data loss probability of a RAID Level 6 given   failures. The array has    stripes 
and   data disks and two parity disks per stripe 
  
Figure 3. Data loss probability of a RAID Level 6 given   failures. The array has    stripes 
and   data disks and two parity disks per stripe. 
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We present an example for RAID Level 6 in Figure 2 and for RAID Level 6+ in 
Figure 3. 
 
C. Reliability of Declustered RAID 
There are many ways to decluster [10] a disk array. Sometimes, people have defined 
layouts, assuming that all disks are equal. In modern datacenters, it is more likely that 
Binary Large OBjects (BLOB) or streams are being stored by grabbing disklets on   
different data disks and adding two or three parity disklets and then repeating the 
process until the object or the stream has been stored.  The first method has the 
advantage that we can calculate data-loss probability exactly, but we can then use the 
result in the former case in order to approximate the second. Therefore, we assume here 
a pre-defined layout. 
In more detail, we assume that all disks in the disk array have equal size. Since 
reliability striping at the individual sector level (4KB) would require much meta-data 
and gain little in dividing recovery workload among all disks in the array, we assume 
that each disk is split into disklets. In order to distribute workload, the number D of 
disklets should be at least in the hundreds, but it does not need to be much more. 
 
Figure 4. Average deviation from fair entanglement in dependence on the number D of disklets. 
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Indeed, a disklet on a healthy disk in a disk array with one failed disk (the most 
common scenario) would be potentially involved only if the disklet is in the same stripe 
as the corresponding disklet in the failed disk. Therefore, the disklet is potentially 
involved with probability   ⁄ , where, as we recall,   is the number of stripes. In a 
RAID Level 6 or 6+, we only need to read   of the remaining healthy     and     
surviving disks, respectively, which gives the file system some choice, that can be used 
for further balancing. Even without taking advantage of this, the number of times t that 
a disklet on a healthy disk is entangled with the failed disk is governed by the binomial 
distribution:  









   
 
*
   
  
 The proportion of entangled disklets on a disk has expected value    , but the 










   
  
√ 
   
which quickly approaches zero, as we can see in Figure 4. There, we depict the average 
deviation of disk from optimal entanglement. By multiplying this number with three, we 
get bounds on the difference to optimal entanglement in which approximately       of 
all disks fall. Because the numbers in Figure 4 are already quite small for D in the mid-
hundreds, we can assume this magnitude for D.  
Operationally, the larger D, the more metadata needs to be kept, but also the longer it 
takes for a stream to fill up a disklet.  
In our context more importantly, the capability of a declustered RAID Level 6 or 
RAID Level 6+ to survive one additional disk failure beyond their guaranteed tolerance 
(of two and three, respectively) depends on D.  
If a configuration without declustering tolerates f failures with a probability of   , 
then its declustered equivalent with D disklets per disk survives with a probability of 
      
 . Because data-loss probabilities with     in the case of RAID Level 6 and 
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    in the case of RAID Level 6+ are so low, the data-loss probability of the 
declustered RAID is higher than what one (or at least me) would intuitively guess. 
 
Figure 5. Dataloss probability in the presence of three failed disks in a declustered RAID Level 
6 with m stripes and n data disks per stripe in dependence on D, the number of disklets per disk 
 
Figure 6. Dataloss probability in the presence of four failed disks in a declustered RAID Level 
6+ with m stripes and n data disks per stripe in dependence on D, the number of disklets per 
disk. 
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Figure 7. Dataloss probability in the presence of five failed disks in a declustered RAID Level 
6+ with m stripes and n data disks per stripe in dependence on D, the number of disklets per 
disk. 
 
As we can see from Figures   –   , the data-loss probability in the declustered layout 
are substantial, but not zero for moderate values of D. This shows that a thorough 
reliability analysis of declustered disk arrays underestimates their reliability if it assumes 
that the array cannot tolerate more failures than its guaranteed tolerance, i.e. two in the 
case of Level 6 and three in case of Level 6+. 
3 Markov Modeling 
Reliability should not exclusively be assessed by using data-loss probabilities in 
dependence on failed disks. The true measures of reliability are Mean Time to Data-
Loss (MTTDL), the survival rate of data for the economic life-span of a disk array, or 
the annual loss rate. We obtain these numbers using a Markov or a Semi-Markov model 
or even a Petri net. In this section, we give the formula for calculating transition 
probabilities and then apply it to calculate the MTTDL for declustered arrays using the 
usual simplifying assumptions. 
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Figure 8. Generic Markov model 
 
A. A Generic Markov Model 
We should capture the current condition of a disk array in as few possible states as 
possible in order to simplify calculations. Often, it is possible to characterize the state of 
a disk array just by the current number of unavailable disks.  The result is a state 
diagram as that presented in Figure 8.  The normal, start state is State 0. There is also an 
absorbing state State F that characterizes a disk array that has lost data. The other states 
in Figure 8 represent situations where the array has suffered loss of access to a disk, but 
where all data stored in it can be recovered. State   is a state where   disks have failed. 
We have a failure transition from State   to State     corresponding to the failure of 
an additional disk, if that failure does not lead to loss of data, and another transition 
from State   to State   in case that the failure has induced data-loss. If data on a disk has 
been recovered and saved on a spare or replacement disk, then we have a repair 
transition from State     to State  . 
This model cannot capture all scenarios. For example, a disk array might have a 
small number of spared disks, but in case of failures, it might take a technician maybe 
weeks to replace the failed disks with new spare disks. 
The rate at which transitions are taken in model reflect more or less reality. In the 
case of failures, a common first-degree approximation is the assumption of exponential 
failure times. In this case, the probability that a functioning disk fails at a given small 
time interval is constant.  (Thus, the hazard rate in the lingo of reliability theory is 
constant.) It is however known that disk failures times are modeled with more accuracy 
using a Weibull distribution, or even better, using real disk lifespans [11]. 
International Journal of Applied Sciences and Smart Technologies 
Volume 2, Issue 2, pages 91–110 





Much more problematic is the modeling of repair times as exponential repair times 
are hardly realistic. An exponential repair time assigns positive probabilities to 
physically impossible short repairs and very lengthy repairs. If technicians with normal 
working hours are involved, times to repair will also depend on the time that the failure 
occurred.  
If both failures and repairs are exponentially distributed, then the state diagram of 
Figure 8 represents a true Markov model. For the researcher, this model is very 
attractive because it sometimes allows closed-form solutions for mean time to data-loss 
and similar measures, and failing that, simpler method for numerical solutions. 
B. Calculating State Transition Probabilities  
The rate with which failure transitions are taken depends on the number of disks that 
can fail and the probability that an additional failure will lead to data loss. In the simple 
case of a Markov model, these are the only contributors.  We call   the probability that 
an additional disk failure in State   leads to data loss. (This is not the    disk failure 
since the system might have experienced a successful repair.) 
                        |                     
If         denotes the probability that the system has suffered data-loss in State  , then we 
have 
                               
Thus, 
    
          
        
  
If we assume exponential repair times that are independent of each other and exponential 
failure times, this gives us a Markov model with: 
1)    non-failure states, where State   represents a disk array with   failed disks. 
2)  A failure state, State  , which is absorbing. 
3)  The start state is State 0. 
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4)  There is a repair transition from State   to State     taken with rate     and fixed 
“repair rate”  .   
5)  There is a failure transition not representing data-loss from State   to State     
taken with rate                . 
6)  There is a failure transition representing data-loss from State   to State     taken 
with rate              
C. MTTDL Calculation for the Markov Model  
If we collect the current probabilities of being in State   at time   in an  -dimensional 
column vector     and the transition rates into a transition matrix , then we have the 
fundamental Chapman-Kolmogorov equation 
 
  
       
The probability that a system has not suffered data-loss at time   is given by the sum 
of all coefficients of  , namely      with a transposed column vector    containing   
one-coefficients. The MTTDL of the system is then given as 
       ∫   




    
  ∫  






    
   
(      )  ∫     
 
 
   
 ∫     
 
 
   
By applying the Laplacian transform to the fundamental differential equation, we 
obtain 
                         
and after setting the new indeterminate   to zero, the definition of the Laplace transform 
gives us 
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We then multiply with    in order to obtain 
      ∫     
 
 
   




            
              
The value of      is of course            since the system starts out in State 1.  
It should be noted that the calculation of the inverse is not without numerical 
challenges as the magnitude of repair transitions is much larger than the magnitude of 
failure transitions, so that matrix  is ill-conditioned. However, this applies only to not 
using good software for numerical inversion and in many cases, just using double 
precision suffices for reasonable precision. 
D. Example:  Declustered RAID Levels 
In the case of a highly declustered RAID Level 5 (one parity per stripe), a RAID 
Level 6 (two parities per stripe), and a RAID Level 6+ (three parities per stripe), the 
Markov models are fairly simple, because then any more than one, two, and three 
failures, respectively, have to lead to data-loss. In the case of RAID Level 5, the 
fundamental differential equation for the state vector made up of the probabilities of the 
system being in State 0 or State 1 
     (
     









                                 
The first addend in the first equation corresponds to the failure transition, taken with 
rate   , from State 0 to State 1, the second summand to the repair transition, taken with 
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rate   from State 1 to State 0, the first summand in the second equation to the failure 
transition from State 0 to State 1 seen above, the second summand to the failure 
transition taken with rate       , from State 1 to  the Failure State, and the last 
addend to the repair transition from State 1 to State 0 again. The transition matrix is 
therefore 
  (
    
           
*  
so that the MTTDL is simply 
       (
    








         
       
    
In the case of a RAID Level 6, our transition matrix needs to capture transitions 
between three non-failure states and has therefore shape    . In particular, we obtain 
the MTTDL as 
         (
     
             









                         
             
   
In the case of the RAID Level6+ with a very high degree of declustering, we can 
assume that the storage system will suffer data-loss whenever four or more disks are 
currently not functioning. In this case, the Markov model becomes particularly easy and 
the MTTDL is given below, where   is the individual disk failure rate, that is, the 
inverse of the expected Mean Time To Failure (MTTF) of a disk, where   is the repair 
rate, that is, the inverse of the expected Mean Time To Repair (MTTR), and   the 
number of disks.  The MTTDL is then 
          
(
 
      
             
                   









which is given in closed form as 
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Figure 9. Mean Time to Data Loss in hours for a fully declustered Level 5 (top), Level 6 
(middle) and Level 6+ (bottom) RAID in dependence on the MTTF of each of the      
individual disks. The scales are both logarithmic. 
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To illustrate this, Figure 9 gives the MTTDL in hours for an ensemble of 90 disks, 
for MTTF of disks ranging between 1000 hours and 1 million hours. The MTTR are 8 
hours, 36 hours, and 100 hours. 
E. Discussion 
MTTDL figures are among the least useful figures of merit for the reliability of a 
disk array, but have the singular advantage of often being able to be derived exactly. 
Other figures of merit such as the probability to survive the economic lifespan of a disk 
array without data-loss are more important. The fantastic figures (a MTTDL of 100 
million years! with normal disks) reflect in part the lack of modeling of catastrophic 
events and essential component failure and in part the implicit assumption that disks fail 
independently. Numerically, e.g. using the Euler method to solve the fundamental 
differential equation of the Markov model, we can derive numbers for the survival 
probability of the data in an array for 5 years.  
Another, serious limitation of the current analysis is the concentration only on disk 
failures. However, as long as the merits of various disk array layouts are compared, this 
is more of a feature than a bug. With other words, even if one converts the MTTDL 
numbers into a failure rate per year, the numbers are not realistic, but they still serve to 
compare the different reliability merits of disk arrays. It is feasible to expand the 
Markov model to model latent sector errors and disk scrubbing, but this goes far beyond 
the goals of this paper. It is also possible to use Markov models in order to deal with 
infant disk mortality [12]. All these possibilities run soon into the difficulty of making 
good modeling assumptions.  
Furthermore, if one is interested in actual failure rates and not in the relative merits 
of disk array layouts, one might have to use actual failure statistics or at least change the 
Markov model to a semi-Markov model in order to model the more generally applicable 
Weibull failure [11]. Finally, while the large-scale storage system of the foreseeable 
future might be disk based, the superior performance of Flash and soon PCM memories 
will see the expansion of this type of very fast storage. What we have learned about 
device failure behavior from disks might or might not transfer to calculating the 
reliability of these devices. 
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4 Conclusion  
We defined two classical extensions of the RAID Level 5 and derived formulae for 
the capability of these disk arrays to survive a given number of disk failures.  We then 
showed how to use these numbers in order to derive one particular figure of merit for 
the resilience of a disk array organized in this manner. No model reflects reality, but 
some are useful, as the saying goes. We have then shown by example how to use these 
calculations to determine the mean time to failure of various declustered RAID Levels.  
RAID Level 6 and Level 6+ can serve as a reference point in order to compare the 
resilience resulting from using one of the many more sophisticated codes that trade off a 
slight increase in parity storage overhead for faster, average recoveries. 
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